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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE
ORDER OF ELKS, NO. 85,
Petitioner,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION and EARL M.
BAKER, SALT LAKE COUNTY
ASSESSOR,
and
TAX COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondents.

Case No.
13826

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
TAX COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF THE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an original action to review certain proceedings, decisions, and orders of the Utah State Tax
Commission wherein certain properties in Salt Lake
County were not exempted from ad valorem property
taxes by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
for the year 1973.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, seeks
affirmation of its decision upholding the decision of
the County Board of Equalization which found that
petitioner's Elks Lodge is not being used exclusively
for charitable purposes as that term is defined by
Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution, and Utah
Code Annotated, Sections 59-2-1, 59-2-30, and 59-231, and that the same is subject to property taxes for
the calendar year 1973.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner, Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks, No. 85, (herein referred to as Elks Lodge),
has failed to state a substantial number of facts
material to respondent's case, and which formed the
basis for respondent, Utah State Tax Commission's,
decision finding the property subject to property
taxes.
References to the transcript of proceedings before the Tax Commission are designated (A) with
the page number following, since the transcript is
designated Exhibit A in the Record on Appeal. References to the remainder of the Record on Appeal
are designated (R) with the page number following.
References to petitioner's Brief are designated (PB)
with the page number following.
It was the determination of the Salt Lake
County Board of Equalization that petitioner's property did not qualify under Utah law for exemption
from property taxes, since the actual use of the
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premises was not exclusively for religious worship
or charitable purposes, regardless of the use of the
income derived therefrom. The county concluded:
"That the overall primary use of the
property is to produce rental and other income
for the fraternal and social benefit of the
Lodge, its members and their families, and
any charitable use is incidental to the primary
use by the Lodge, its members and their families . . . "
"Hence, the property is not used exclusively for charitable purposes within the
meaning of the Utah law." (R-40)
Petitioner performs patriotic, charitable, and
civic functions, including: Boys' and Girls' Clubs
(A-13); local sports programs for children (A-14);
veterans' services programs (A-22); boy-scout
troops (A-92, 93), all of which functions are charitable activities within the State of Utah, but, significantly, said charitable activities were not actually
conducted on the premises in question. Said charitable functions are held at locations and buildings
elsewhere within the State of Utah. The majority of
of charitable functions performed by petitioner are
through cash donations of members, plus a multitude
of man-hours contributed outside of the premises in
question. (A-29) Petitioner makes no contention
that its property is used for religious purposes. (A119)
Petitioner's premises are used in part for the
sale of liquor and cigars. (A-67, 68) The proceeds
of said liquor and cigar sales go toward paying for

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

services and, thereafter, into a general fund to be
used for the different programs of the Elks Lodge.
(A-68) The petitioner holds lodge meetings once a
week, each week throughout the year, except for six
weeks in the summer and provides other major social
functions of a large variety, including, but not limited to, Friday night dancing to live music and various and sundry formal dances. (A-73, 74) Said
areas designated for social functions, such as dancing, include some sixteen booths, tables for about 100
people, a dance floor and band area and bar, inasmuch as petitioner has a mini-bottle license and is
also a Utah State liquor store. (A-76)
A substantial number of nonmembers enters
into petitioner's facility (A-118) primarily for dinner, drink, recreational or other social functions.
(A-121) A member is defined as a husband and
wife, at least one of whom has been initiated a member and is paying dues, and a nonmember is everyone
else. (A-117)
Petitioner's premises include a building and a
parking lot. The building has six floors. (A-77) Half
of the basement floor is a lounge, and the other half
is taken up by mechanical systems of the lodge,
including a heating unit, air-conditioning, change
lockers, etc. (A-77) On the basement floor is a small
"members only" lounge with pool tables and a bar.
(A-77-78) The first floor above the basement contains a large lobby area, office space, dining room,
"antler room, kitchen and rest rooms." (A-78) The
second floor above the basement contains a ladies'
lounge, a storage area, a lobby, the lodge room for
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regular lodge meetings, and a small officers' meeting
room. (A-83) The third floor from the basement is
designated the "goodwill room" and is used 75 percent to store and process clothing which is ultimately
donated to indigents. (A-88) The remaining 25 percent of the third floor is used for storage of petitioner's property, (A-88) The fourth floor from the
basement contains one committee room, and the balance is used for storage of petitioner's property.
(A-88) The fifth floor is used 100 percent for storage of petitioner's property. (A-88, 89)
A few charity-related activities: One handicapped children's Christmas party, a fund-raising
drive, a boxing show, and a youth scholarship award
banquet, are actually held on petitioner's premises.
(A-102)
The only financial report before the Utah State
Tax Commission is the audited financial statement
for the year ended March 31, 1972, prepared by
Morrison, Rindlisbaker and Gilchrist, CPA's. (R-23
to 30) Pursuant to said financial statement, petitioner's lodge received $38,991.77 in cash solely for charitable purposes (R. 23 to 30) but only expended the
sum of $29,470.65 for charitable purposes. (R.28)
(See also A-99) This $10,000 surplus received for
charity is allegedly to operate certain programs incidental to charity and advertising through bulletins
and posters in support of charity programs. (A-99,
100) Revenues, pursuant to said financial statement,
equal $117,202.95, and other revenues from sales at
$183,000, totaling about $300,000 of gross revenue
each year. (A-98) (R.28, 29) There are additional
5
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funds collected for charity not recorded on the financial statement through a nickel-and-dime charity
pot. (A-98) Total charity revenues and charity expenditures are each less than ten percent of the total
revenue taken in by petitioner. (A-99) The balance
of revenue collected yearly is used for lodge membership functions and other social, recreational and noncharitable matters. (R-28)
The procedural matters regarding the hearing
and subsequent appeal to this court, as set forth in
petitioner's Brief (PB-4), are substantially correct.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EXEMPTION

F R O M U T A H ' S AD VALOREM

PROP-

TAX UNDER ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 2, OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IS BASED
UPON THE ACTUAL USE OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION FOR CHARTIBLE PURPOSES, AND, AS SUCH, PETITIONER'S PROPERTY DOES NOT QUALIFY.

ERTY

Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution, provides:
"All tangible property in the state, not
exempt under the laws of the United States,
or under this constitution, shall be taxed in
proportion to its value, to be ascertained as
provided by law. The property of the state,
counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libraries, lots
with the buildings thereon used exclusively
for either religious worship or charitable purposes . . . shall be exempt from taxation . . ."
6
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-30 (1953),
provides:
"This section is intended to clarify the
scope of exemptions for property used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable purposes provided for in section 2 of
Article XIII of the Constitution of the state of
Utah. This section is not intended to expand
or limit the scope of such exemptions. Any
property whose use is dedicated to religious
worship or charitable purposes including
property which is incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of such religious worship or charitable purposes, intended to benefit an indefinite number of
persons is exempt from taxation if all of the
following requirements are met:
(1) The user is not organized to produce
a profit from the use of the property.
(2) No part of any net earnings, from
the use of the property, inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual, but
any net earnings shall be used directly or indirectly, for the charitable or religious purposes of the organization.
(3) The property is not used or operated by the organization or other person so
as to benefit any officer, trustee, director,
shareholder, lessor, member, employee, contributor, or any other person through the distribution of profits, payment of excessive
charges or compensations.
(4) Upon the liquidation, dissolution, or
abandonment of the user no part of any pro7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ceeds derived from such use will inure to the
benefit of any private person."
The leading and controlling case in this matter
is the 1971 decision by this Court of Friendship Manor Corporation v. Tax Commission, 26 Utah 2d 227,
487 P.2d 1272 (1971), wherein this Court held that
simply providing a housing facility for elderly persons was not a charitable purpose, and the property
was not exempt. The central focus of the above case
was on the actual use of the premises, and the Court
concluded, as follows:
"It is the use to which it puts its real
property, which is the determination of
whether or not such property is exempt. If the
charitable organization does not use its real
property and building thereon exclusively for
charitable purposes, such property is not
exempt, notwithstanding^ the fact that the
owner thereof is a charitable organization."
(At page 234) (Emphasis added.)
Respondent suggests that not only is the "actual
use" to which property is put the test, but the "actual, dominant and primary use" of the property.
"Primary" being inferred from Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-30 (1953), providing for "incidental and reasonably necessary." The above case
recognized that an organization may be charitable
and still be subject to property taxes. The Elks Lodge
property in question is not "property which is incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of such charitable purposes." Petitioner's
property consists of a lot, including a parking area,
and a building with six floors. There is no question
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that five of the sixfloorsare used for lodge activities,
liquor and cigar sales' consumption, and other meetings and social and fraternal activities of the members. In terms of total space, the amount of petitioner's property used for noncharitable activities is not
incidental to its charitable activities, but, instead, its
charitable functions and activities on the premises
are only incidental to its lodge and social functions.
In terms of total value, the portion of petitioner's
property used for charity is only "incidental" to the
value of the whole property. In terms of time utilized
for charitable purposes, the use of said property is
only "incidental" to its other uses for social, recreational, and fraternal matters. "Incidental" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition
at page 904, as: "Depending upon or appertaining
to something else as primary; something necessary,
appertaining to, or depending upon another which
is termed the principal; something incidental to the
main purpose." Petitioner's Elks Lodge property is
primarily dedicated to the recreational, social, and
fraternal matters of its dues-paying members. Its
primary purpose is not charity; hence, the exemption for property which is incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of such
charitable purposes within the meaning of Utah
Code Annotated, Section 59-2-30 (1953), does not
apply to the Elks Lodge property.
This distinction between primary and incidental
is important, especially in this case. Almost all businesses and most individuals within this State either
make some charitable and religious contributions or
9
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permit an occasional use of some of their property
for charitable or religious purposes, yet relatively
few individuals and businesses have applied for any
exemption on any portion of their premises. If it
were to become necessary to review property when
such contributions or "incidental" use of property
were made, it would become a horrendous administrative responsibility to attempt to determine how
much of each parcel of property was used for what
proportion of time for religious or charitable purposes.
In this case, the Elks Lodge argues that because
approximately ten percent of its expenditures are
for charitable purposes and because nearly one-sixth
of the building is used primarily for charitable purposes, the whole building and parking lot should be
tax exempt; or, in the alternative, that the portion of
the building which is used only for charitable activities should be exempt. However, this argument
totally ignores the fact that the "primary" use of
the building is for social, recreational and fraternal
purposes, and the charitable activities are only incidental to those social, recreational and fraternal
activities. Therefore, it is submitted that any charitable use of the building is only incidental to the
primary use for social, recreational and fraternal
purposes, and that such incidental charitable use of
the building does not qualify under the statutory and
constitutional terms as "used exclusively for religious worship or charitable purposes" and does not
qualify for exemption.
10
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In Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961
(1901), the Court stated:
"The general rule is that all property of
what kind soever, and by whomsoever owned
is subject to taxation; and when any kind of
property is exempt, it constitutes an exception
to this rule. The reason of the rule is that it
is just and equitable that every species of
property within the state should bear its equal
proportion of the burdens of the government.
When, therefore, an owner claims that certain
property is exempt from taxation, the burden
is upon him to show that it falls within the
exception. An exemption will not be aided by
judicial interpretation. It must be shown to
exist by express terms of the enactment which
it is claimed grants it. 'The presumption is
that all exemptions intended to be granted
were granted in express terms. In such cases
the rule of strict construction applies, and, in
order to relieve any species of property from
its due and just proportion of the burdens of
the government, the language relied on as cre. ating the exemption should be so clear as not
to admit of reasonable controvery about its
meaning; for all doubts must be resolved
against the exemption. The power to tax rests
upon necessity, and is essential to the existence of the state.'"
Decisions of other states regarding similar Elks
Lodge property are relevant. In Indianapolis Elks
Building Corporation v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 145 Ind. 522, 251 N.E. 2d 673 (1969),
the Court held that the Elks Lodge real property
owned for the benefit of a fraternal organization was
not entitled to a tax exemption as charitable where
11
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the inescapable conclusion was that the dominant
and primary use of the property was social. The
Court, in applying a "dominant use of the property"
test under its statute exempting property used exclusively for charitable purposes, stated the following:
"Our definition [of 'charity'] is constitutionally liberal, while appellant's definition
renders virtually every act of man and incorporation a tax-exempt charitable act. A thorough explanation is obviously necessary. The
Supreme Court decision in the case of City
of Indianapolis v. Grand Master of the Grand
Lodge of Indiana (1865), 25 Ind. 518, supplies the lasting but nebulous constitutional
definition of the charity. The Court's eloquent
statement is found on page 522.
" '. . . It is not essential to charity that it
must be universal. That an institution limits
the dispensation of its blessings to one sex,
or to the inhabitants of a particular city or
district, or to the membership of a particular
religious or secular organization, does not, we
think, deprive it either in legal or popular
apprehension of the character of a charitable
institution. If that only be charity which relieves human want, without discriminating
amongst those who need relief, then indeed it
it a rarer virtue than has been supposed. . . .
The appellant's facilities and activities undoubtedly suppress human want and suffering
in addition to promoting brotherly love, justice, fidelity, etc. But these noble objectives
can also be seen in the family home and at
various other public and private establishments, all of which are not exempt from
12
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property tax. . . . The inescapable conclusion
is that the dominant and primary purpose of
the use of appellant's property is social/ "
Indianapolis Elks Building Corp. v. State Bd.
of Tax Commissioners, supra, at page 682.
In the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks
Lodge, No. 4,61 v. New Mexico Property Appraisal
Department, 83 N.M. 445, 493 P.2d 411 (1972), the
Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the Elks
Lodge property was not entitled to property tax
exemption where the primary uses of such property
were not charitable.
In the case of Salt Lake Lodge, No. 85, B.P.O.E.
v. Groesbeck, 40 Utah 1, 120 P. 192 (1911), wherein
the Court considered the exemption of petitioner's
property in 1911, the Court stated:
"The general rule is that when private
property is claimed to be exempt from taxation the law under which the exemption is
claimed will be strictly construed. . . . There
is, however, an exception to this general rule,
and statutes exempting property used for
educational and charitable purposes or for
public worship, under the great weight of
authority, should receive a broad and more
liberal construction than those exempting
property used with a view to gain or profit
only. The reason for the rule is that the state,
by exempting property used exclusively for
one or more of the purposes mentioned, from
taxation, is presumed to receive benefits from
the property equivalent at least to the public
revenue that would otherwise be derived from
it." (At page 8-9)
13
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The above-cited case relies upon a principle that a
charitable organization relieves the state from some
burden to care for the downtrodden, which should
give rise to a reciprocating exemption by the state
from property taxes. This broad generalization creates many difficulties and should be rejected for the
following policy reasons:
(1) The taxpayer claimant chooses the charities that will receive the benefits. Some
charitable organizations, such as the Boy
Scouts of America, are certainly worthwhile charitable organizations; however,
the State of Utah, and, specifically, Salt
Lake County, has no legal obligation to
support the Boy Scouts of America.
Therefore, the state is not necessarily
being relieved of any burden at all. The
state does have an obligation to provide
an adequate school system for youngsters
and to provide many other services, including police protection, health and safety maintenance, which obligations must
be paid for out of property tax revenues.
(2) Organizations, such as the Salt Lake
Elks Lodge, could theoretically comply
with the above principle if it were the
sole test, by merely contributing an
amount equal to their property tax liability to a tax-exempt charity. From the
facts given, the Salt Lake Elks Lodge
had some $300,000 in gross revenues of
which $29,000 were expended for charitable purposes. Therefore, the Salt Lake
Elks Lodge could have a total gross revenue of $300,000 and only contribute an
amount equal to their property tax liabil14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ity and comply with the above test. "The
power to tax rests upon necessity and is
essential to the existence of the state."
Friendship Manor, supra. The erroding
tax base would result in one less revenue
source to conduct necessary state affairs
and necessarily causes increased taxes in
other areas, such as sales tax, to make
up the difference. If such organizations
then did contribute an amount equal to
their property taxes and gain exemption,
they would have the benefits of (1), exemption from property taxes and (2), a
charitable deduction for income taxes,
which is in juxtaposition to double taxation, that being of double deduction and,
ultimately, double benefit to the Elks
Lodge.
(3) The above principle requires a specific
economic or dollar test to be applied to
the taxpayer claiming an exemption and
would be extremely difficult to follow and
administer in other cases not specifically
decided by the court.
If the above test regarding the receipt of benefits equivalent to the public revenue derived from the
taxation is rejected, then what test should apply? It
it suggested that to be exempt from property tax
laws, a test as to the "primary, dominant and actual
use" of the property should apply. Such a test could
be determined in terms of revenue intake and expenditure for charitable purposes; time and space allocation; a dedication to the conduct of charitable
activities, and an examination of the specific purposes and intent for which the organization seeking
exemption is organized and actually operated.
15
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Under the facts in the present case, the Elks
Lodge's charitable activities are merely incidental
to the primary, dominant, and actual use of the
premises for social activities and fraternal meetings
in terms of revenue and expenditures, time and space
allocations and purposes for which organized and
operated. Exemption from property taxes should be
denied.
POINT II
T H E ALLOWANCE OF A PERCENTAGE OR PARTIAL
EXEMPTION OF ONE BUILDING IS CONTRARY TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND IS ADMINISTRATIVELY AN UNDUE
BURDEN UPON THE GOVERNMENT.

Petitioner has urged that in all cases cited the
test applied to determine whether a portion of the
property was subject to taxation and a portion exempt was whether the property in question was
leased to another for commercial or business purposes, or whether the organization used it for general business purposes. Petitioner then suggests that:
(1) It is a charitable organization not organized
for profit and, therefore, (2) since it, in fact, leases
no portion of said premises for business purposes, it
should be exempt. (PB-15)
Reference is made to Utah Code Annotated,
Section 16-6-22 (1953), which statutorily authorizes
every nonprofit corporation to purchase, take, receive, lease, take by gift, or otherwise acquire, own,
hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and with
real or personal property, or any interest therein,
wherever situated. A nonprofit corporation may also
16
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sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its
property and assets (Utah Code Annotated, Section
16-6-22 (4) (5), (1953). The designation "nonprofit" or "not organized for pecuniary gain" is a
legal definition and means a corporation, no part
of the net earnings of which are distributable to its
members, trustees or officers (Utah Code Annotated,
Section 16-6-19 (3) (1953). Therefore, under Utah
law, any nonprofit corporation may, in fact, lease
property, derive a profit therefrom and still not
jeopardize its character as a nonprofit corporation,
or jeopardize its exemption from state franchise
taxes, unless said activities become dominant, primary activities for profit. (See Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-13-4 (1953).
The partial allocation of property taxes apparently first found acceptance in Parker v. Quinn, 23
U. 332, 64 P. 961 (1901), cited supra, when a portion of a relief society building rented for commercial purposes was subject to tax and a portion not
so rented was exempt. Since that time, the Utah Legislature recognized that many property tax matters
are, in fact, not totally 100 percent charitably qualified, and many are not totally 100 percent disqualified as charities. Many properties have some
incidents of charity exemption and some incidents of
taxation. By adoption of Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-30, the Legislature specified that some
"incidental" and "reasonably necessary" property
would not defeat a total exemption. Likewise, any
charitable use of property which is "incidental" to
a primary use for noncharitable purposes should
17
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not give rise to a partial exemption but should be
totally subject to tax.
It is also a well-established principle that all
exemptions from taxation intended to be granted
were granted in express terms (Parker v. Quinn,
supra). The statute does not grant a partial exemption. Exemptions should be strictly construed against
one seeking exemption (Parker v. Quinn, supra).
Cases cited by petitioner regarding a partial
exemption from property taxes are distinguishable
from Utah law. In Simpson v. Bohon, 159 Fla. 281,
31 So. 2d 406 (1947), (cited at PB 13), wherein the
Court held that 43 percent of an Elks Club Lodge
rented out for commercial purposes was subject to
taxation and the remainder exempt, the Court relied
upon a statute not found in Utah law. The Court
stated:
"For the exemption to hold under the
statute, the proceeds from the rented portion
must also be used for someone of the named
purposes. This part of the statute, Section
192.06 FFA, reads:
"'(3) . . . . and the rents, issues and
profits of said property are used for the educational, literary, benevolent, fraternal or
charitable purposes of said institution.' We
do not find it so here." (At pages 407, 408)
The Court also referred to Florida statutes, Section
192.06 FFA, as specifically exempting benevolent
and fraternal institutions from taxation. (At page
407) Under Utah law, there is no statute regarding
the exemption of property from ad valorem property
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taxes when the income derived therefrom is utilized
for charitable purposes. The sole test in Utah is "use
of the property." Also, the Florida statute expressly
provided an exemption for property used for benevolent and fraternal purposes, whereas the Utah
statutes and Constitution do not permit any similar
exemptions.
In the case of Oklahoma County v. Queen City
Lodge No. 197, I.I.O.F., 195 Okla. 131, 156 P.2d
340 (1945) (cited PB-14), the Court stated that
Oklahoma's Constitution provided an exemption
from property tax for "benevolent institutions devoted solely to the appropriate objects of these institutions, not exceeding ten acres in extent, and not
leased or otherwise used with a view to pecuniary
profit." (At page 347) The Oklahoma Court noted in
passing that apparently the lodge purchased the
building in question and, at such time, agreed to an
arrangement whereby the management and renting
of the first elevenfloorswere to be handled, in effect,
by a representative of the mortgage creditors; and
so it was argued that in truth and in fact, the lodge
has not assumed the act of possession of management
or control of the first eleven floors of the building.
(At page 345) The Court held the twelfth floor exempt from taxation. The Oklahoma Court, in quoting
from Volume II, Cooley on Taxation, 4th Ed., page
1442, Section 688, noted:
"On the other hand, the better rule seems
to be that if the exempt and nonexempt parts
are separable, for purposes of valuation, the
former should be held not taxable and the
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latter taxable." (At page 349) (Emphasis
added.)
In the present case, the petitioner has testified that
approximately "75 percent of the floor known as the
"goodwill room" (A-88) is actually used for charitable purposes. Under the Oklahoma case cited by
petitioner, the Elks Lodge's goodwill room would
not be entitled to tax exemption, since it is not a
separable part.
Partial or percentage exemptions also create
administrative difficulties. Are the halls and stairways leading to the exemptfloorexempt on a portion
of their use? Is a portion of the parking lot exempt?
Are offices utilized for preparation of check receipts
and disbursements pertaining to the charitableexempt floor subject to a partial exemption also?
Should exemption be for actual square foot usage
as a ratio to the total property, including all contiguous land and other buildings on the same lot? The
Elks Lodge seeks exemption for 75 percent of one
floor of a six-floor building, which is one building
on a multi-building property with parking spaces.
Petitioner's total property is in a highly developed
area of Salt Lake and includes a parking lot and
another building leased commercially. Such percentage allocations are arbitrary and necessarily discriminatory to other taxpayers in the manner in
which the exemption is ultimately granted. From
here, how do you differentiate industries that
contribute to charities or allow limited charitable
activities on their premises; i.e., "sub-for-Santa"
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collection and preparation? What percentage charitable deduction should be allowed?
It is respectfully submitted that the Court
should not allow any exemption unless the tests of
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-30, are met in
terms of "primary use" of property for total exemption. Petitioner's request for a partial exemption
should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that the State
Tax Commission in affirming the decision of the
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization finding on
the facts as applied to Utah law, was correct, and
that the property known as the Elks Lodge was not
used exclusively for charitable purposes and, hence,
was subject to the ad valorem property taxes within
the State of Utah for 1973.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
G. BLAINE DAVIS
Chief Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Assistant Attorney General
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